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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ERNEST E. BLAKE1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. Case No. 15668 
HUBERT C. LAMBERT) STATE ENGINEER) 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, to re-
view a decision of the State Engineer denying Appellant further 
extension of time to complete his appropriation of water under 
Applications Nos. 33554, 35444 and 36370, and lapsing these 
Applications. Appellant is seeking a reinstatement of said 
Applications and a further extension of t~rne for each Applica-
tlon. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court ruled that Appellant had failed to show 
due diligence or reasonable cause for delay in completing his 
appropriation of water under Applications "os. 33554, 35444 and 
36570, and therefore was not entitled to further extensions of 
t~me. The Court upheld the decision of the State Engineer deny-
ing ,'\.ppellant' s request for additlonal time and lapsing these 
Applicatlons. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the Trial Court 
was correct and proper in all respects an~ should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with most of the facts set forth in 
Appellant's Brief concerning Applications Nos. 33554, 35444, 
and 36570, but disagrees with some of the conclusions made there· 
in. Further, there are certain additional facts that Appell~t 
has omitted which are relevant to the Court's consideration of 
this matter. It is believed that the following surr®ary of each 
of the three Applications involved in this appeal will be help-
ful in evaluating the legal arguments which follow. 
By way of introduction, it should be pointed out that 11hen 
an application to appropriate water is approved, the applicant 
is given a specific time within which to place the water to be~e­
ficial use and submit proof of appropriation (§73-3-10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended). At this point, the applicant 
may submit his proof of appropriation if he has completed his 
project, or he may request an extension of time within which to 
do so. All requests for extensions of time must be by affida-
vit ( § 7 3-3-12, Utah Code Annotated 19 53, as amended) , and the 
State Engineer--upon a proper showing of diligence in complet-
ing the project or a reasonable cause for delay--may grant the 
applicant an extension of time. Thus, it is these extension 
requests that contain the basic evidence from which it must be 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determined whether the applicant has been diligent. These 
requests are contained on Appellant's three Application files. 
On the front of each file is a chronological summary showing 
the dates of the various extensions granted by the State Engi-
neer and the requests for further extension extracted from 
Appellant's extension requests. The documents described on 
the summary sheets are contained within the Application files, 
and are tabbed with numbers corresponding to the number given 
each document listed on the summary sheets. For example, on 
Application No. 35444 (Ex. 3), Appellant's third extension re-
quest is identified and summarized as Item No. 4, with tab num-
ber 4 being attached to the extension request itself. 
Appellant's Applications can be summarized as follows: 
No. 1: Application No. 36570 (Ex. 2) -- This Application 
sought to appropriate 3 c.f.s. of water for irriga-
tion, domestic and stockwaterinc; :=;Jrt='GSes by means 
of drains located in Wide Canyon, Washington County. 
This Application was approved by the State Engineer 
on July 11, 1966. Appellant requested (Ex. 2, Tabs 
l, 2, 4 & 6) and received four separate extensions 
of time to complete this project covering a period 
of approximately 6~ years (Ex. 2, Tabs l, 3, 5 & 7) 
Appellant's final extension request stated that in 
excess of $200.00 worth of development ".-JOrk had been 
done on the proJect, and estlmated that it would 
cost about $1,300.00 to complete the project (Ex. 2, 
Tab 7). However, thls $200.00 had been expended 
dur1ng ~r1or extens1on per1ods (Ex. 2, Tab 21. Rea-
sons oiven for requestlno ~urther extension were that 
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Appellant had been involved in a drawn-out divorce 
and had been prevented from completing his project 
because of conditions prescribed by the Bureau of 
Land Management and the State Engineer. On January 
12, 1973, the State Engineer denied Appellant any 
further extension of time and lapsed this Application. 
No. 2: Application No. 35444 (Ex. 3) This Application 
sought to appropriate .50 c.f.s. of water for domestic, 
stockwatering, and irrigation purposes from Rock Hollow 
Wash in Washington County. This Application was 
approved by the State Engineer on February 11, 1965 
(Ex. 3, Tab 1). Appellant requested (Ex. 3, Tabs 1, 
2, 4 & 6) and received four separate extensions of time 
covering a period of approximately eight years (Ex. 3, 
Tabs 1, 3, 5 & 7). Appellant's last extension request 
stated that about $400.00 worth of development work 
had been done on this project to install a collection 
box, some drain tile and plastic pipe, but that Appel-
lant had not been able to complete the project because 
of a drawn-out divorce action and conditions prescribed 
by the Bureau of Land Management and the State Engineer 
(Ex. 3, Tab 8). However, the work accomplished had been 
done under earlier extension requests (Ex. 3, Tabs 2 
and 4). The State Engineer, by Memorandum Decision 
dated January 12, 1973, denied Appellant any further 
extension of time and lapsed this Application. 
No. 3: Application No. 33554 (Ex. 4) -- This Application sought 
to appropriate 1 c.f.s. of water for irrigation and 
stockwatering purposes from certain open cuts located 
in Section 35, Township 40 South, Range 16 West, SLB&~L 
in Washington County. 
November 23, 1962 (Ex. 
This Application was approved on 
4, Tab 1). Appellant requested 
(Ex. 4, Tabs 1, 2, 5 & 7) and received five separate 
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extensions of time covering a period of approximately 
ten years (Ex. 4, Tabs 1, 3, 4, 6 & 9). Appellant's 
final extension request stated that caterpillar, other 
machine, and well development work had been done at a 
cost in excess of $2,100.00, and that the estimated 
cost of completing the project was $3,800.00. Reasons 
given for not completing the project were the same as 
for the other two Applications. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the bulk of Appellant's $2,100.00 expendi-
ture was for the drilling of a well which he had begun 
some years earlier (Ex. 4, Tab 5) and which was not 
covered by this Application (T. 37-39; Ex. 4, Tabs 
8-A through -D). The Trial Court concluded that funds 
expended outside the scope of Appellant's project could 
not be considered in the evaluation of Appellant's dili-
gence in completing his approved project (R. 40, 44). 
The foregoing is a brief summary of the history and develop-
ment of Appellant's three Applications, as summarized from Appel-
lant's Affidavits and the State Engineer's files. Appellant 
testified that all of his costs and some of the work he had done 
himself were not reflected in his extension requests (T. 24, 26). 
An addltional factual matter--and one of primary importance 
in evaluating Appellant's extension requests--is that Appellant 
never obtained the rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment necessary to develop the water sources involved in these 
three Applications and to convey the water to its place of use 
(R. 33; T. 40-42). Further, in the Pre-Trial Order it was stip-
ulated that Appellant was not the owner nor in possession of 
the land 'tJhere the water 'tJas ?reposed to be used under said 
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Applications (R. 33). 
There are unapproved applications located in the general 
vicinity of Appellant's Applications. Appe~lant has three un-
approved applications by which he seeks to appropriate a total 
of 31 c.f.s. of water (Exs. 5, 6 & 7). There are also other in-
dividuals in this same situation. Exhibit No. 8 contains four 
separate unapproved applications by other individuals seeking 
to appropriate water in this area. The State Engineer testified 
that a question exists as to whether there is unappropriated 
water in this vicinity, and that part of this uncertainty is 
not knowing whether Appellant would ever perfect the three 
Applications which are the subject of this appeal (T. 55-58). 
These other applicants are anxious to have an opportunity to 
proceed with their applications (T. 58). 
Respondent will reply to the points raised in Appellant's 
Brief in the order in which they are set forth therein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW DUE DILIGENCE OR REASON-
ABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY IN PERFECTING APPLICATIONS 
NOS. 33554, 35444 AND 36570, AND THE TRIAL COCRT 
PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT cm1PLIED 
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-3-12, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED. 
A. Purpose of and Need for Due Diligence Requirements 
The requirement that an appropriator of water proceed 
with due diligence or show reasonable cause for delay in ?erfec:· 
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ing his appropriation is one of the fundamental principles of 
the appropriation doctrine. Even before the Western States 
adopted their water codes, various courts had ruled that in 
order for an appropriator to perfect a water right and maintain 
a priority date relating back to when his appropriation was in-
itiated, he must proceed with due and reasonable diligence to 
place the water to beneficial use (Nevada County & Sacramento 
Canal Co. v. Kidd, 37 Cal. 282 (1869); Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 
371, l7 Pac. 453 (1888)). This concept was bottomed on the 
sound and practical premise that development and utilization 
of the very limited water resources was so critical to the dev-
elopment of other resources and the overall publ~c interes'- ~~at 
no one should be ent~tled to tie up water for an extensive per-
~od of time without placing it to a beneficial use. In other 
words, if a proposed appropriator was unab~e tc develop this 
public resource within a reasonable time, others should be 
given the opportunity to do so. This requirement was sound 
when it was adopted, and is even more relevant today with the 
tremendous demands that are being placed on our limited un-
appropriated water. This Court recognized this principle in 
the case of Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Assoc., 19 
Ut.2d 6, 425 P.2d 405 (1967). At page 9 of the Gtah Reporter 
1t is stated: 
Sanpete's successful extensions for decades leaving 
but few years to go, ~mpel tjis court, in a conceded 
equl~! case, tc canvass the facts to determine if, 
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in this arid state, where a drop of water is a 
drop of gold, one, by extension after extension, 
may equitably prevent beneficial use of water by 
others through procedural stagnation for about 
forty years. We think not, 
Appellant has been given more than ample time to utilize 
this public resource, and other potential appropriators are 
anxiously awaiting an opportunity to develop the limited water 
supply in this area (Ex. 8; T. 58). 
B. Section 73-3-12 and the Test for Determining Diligence 
As the various States adopted their water codes, the 
due diligence requirement in perfecting approved applications 
formed a part of the states' statutory water law. In Utah, 
this requirement is found in Section 73-3-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended. Once the State Engineer determines 
that an application should be approved under the provisions of 
Section 73-3-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, the appl~-
cant is given a specific time within which to construct his pro· 
ject, place the water to beneficial use and submit proof of 
appropriation (§73-3-10, supra). An applicant's time for accom· 
plishing this can be extended under the provisions of §73-3-12 
upon a proper showing of diligence or reasonable cause for de-
lay . .Y 
1. Since an amendment to this Section in 1975, an applicant 
has the responsibility of affirmativel'! shm1ing that he has 
exercised or is exercising reasonable and due dillgence towar~ 
the completion of his appropriation, and extenslons gran ted b:· 
the State Engineer shall be effective so long as the app~lc~nt 
shall continue to exercise reasonable diligence i~ comoletl~S 
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This Court has ruled that the determination of diligence or 
reasonable cause for delay for an approved application under 
§73-3-12 is essentially a question of fact. This test was an-
nounced in the first Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users 
Assoc. case, 10 Ut.2d 376, 353 P.2d 916 (1960): 
Whether due diligence has been used or there has 
been reasonable delay in commencing the construc-
tlon of works to appropriate water under an appli-
cation is a question of fact to be determined from 
all the circumstances surrounding each particular 
case. \mat acts might reasonably be found to be 
due diligence under one set of circumstances might 
not under other conditions. The real criterion 
appears to be the bona fides of the attempt to 
approprlate which mlght be pursued with all the 
expedition and constant effort to a<::<::orr.plish the 
undertakinc; which ::.s usual "in men engac;ed ::.:: li'•2 
enterprises, and who desire a speedy accomplislun"":.·~ 
of their designs" (10 Ct.2d at 37S). 
This test was amplifled in the second Carbon Canal Co. v. 
Sanpete Water Users .:l.ssoc. case, 19 L't.2c ;; , ~2S P. 2d 405 (1967), 
wherein it . ..,as stated t~at ne::.ther lack :.: ::.mc.s to complete the 
project nor ill health would dispense w::.th the necessity of act-
ually placing the '"'ater to beneficial use wit..Y1in a reasonable 
time. Because of the importance of water de•1elopment in this 
State, the Court further pointed out that the applicant has a 
substantial burden of demonstratlng facts wr . .:.ch ·.vould justify 
a further extenslon of t.:.me: 
We thlnk t~e ev.:.dence ~resented ::.n either or both 
cf tne cases -.:om:2els us to resolve the doubt ln 
favor of due d::.l~cence ::.n exoedi tlous development 
of water, and nat..-.:.n favor oi the delay reflected 
ln the ~acts de~elcped, ~est of whlch were inad-
mlss.:.ols, hav.:.nc occurred 3:ter the extension had 
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expired. In the light of this principle, we hold 
that the applicant proved neither the required 
diligence nor a reasonable excuse for delay by 
that hi h t e of convincing evidence demanded in 
water development cases 19 Ut.2 at 8) (Emphasis 
Added). 
Later, in the same opinion, the Court noted that the appli-
cant had not sustained its burden of showing that it was entit-
led to a further extension of time " . by that high degree 
of quantitative and qualitative proof necessary in cases having 
to do with such water rights" (19 Ut.2d at 9). 
Since the facts are so important in determining whether an 
applicant is entitled to a further extension of time, it is now 
time to look at the facts upon which Appellant relies and see 
if he has met his burden with the "high degree" of proof re-
quired in extension cases. 
C. The Facts of this Case Fall Short of Showing that 
Appellant is Entitled to Additional Time 
The evidence in this case, which fully supports the 
Findings and Decree of the Trial Court, overwhelmingly shows 
that Appellant has not proceeded with due diligence or shown 
reasonable cause for delay on any of the three Applications 
involved in this appeal. 
1. Development Cannot be Made under Existing Con-
ditions 
One of Appellant's primary reasons for clalming 
that he is entitled to further extensions of time on these 
three Applications is because of his inability to secure the 
necessary rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land Management to 
10 
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develop the water sources involved. In order to secure water 
at the points of diversion covered by the three subJect Applica-
tions and transport that water to the place where Appellant in-
tends to use it, it is necessary to secure rights-of-way from 
the Bureau of Land Management. Appellant's inability to secure 
these rights-of-way has existed ever since these Applications 
were approved (Exs. 2, 3 & 4) and, while Appellant has made cer-
tain efforts to secure these rights-of-way, the fact is he has 
been unable to do so (R. 33), and has no present prospect for 
obtaining such rights-of-way (T. 40-42). In other words, Appel-
lant was no closer to solving this problem when !'lis last exten-
sion request was denied that he was when the Appl~cations Nere 
approved. Applicant has had a substantial amount of time to 
solve this problem, but has made no appreciable progress toward 
solving it (Appellant did secure a special lar.d ·.:se permit for 
a one-year period in 1969, but this was for a well site which 
was not covered by any of Appellant's three Applications (Ex. 
ll)). Without these rights-of-way, Appellant will never be able 
to perfect these Applications. While an applicant should be 
given a reasonable time to secure the easements necessary to 
develop his project, suc!'l delays should not be allowed to tie 
up a water source for an extended period of time. This is par-
ticularlj true where ot!'ler applicants are waiting for an oppor-
turu ty to use t!'le available water supply. 
~ot onl/ lS .::l.ppellant wlthout the r.:.ghts-of-way necessary 
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for his project, but at the time of the Pre-Trial of this matte:, 
Appellant had lost whatever interest he may have had in the lane 
where he proposes to use the water. In the Pre-Trial Order en-
tered on June 13, 1977, it was stipulated by the parties that: 
The Plaintiff [Appellant] is not the owner of record, 
nor is he in possession of any leases or rights-of-
way which give him possession or control of the land 
where the various points of diversion are located or 
where the water is to be used under said Applications. 
Following the Pre-Trial, Appellant did secure two leases for 
property in this area. However, the one lease--which is for a 
five-year period--does not cover the place of use described in 
any of the three subject Applications (Ex. 14). The second lease 
(for only ten acres of land) is only for a period of one year 
with an option to purchase (Ex. 13) . However, both of these doc· 
uments are irrelevant to Appellant's last extension request 
(which expired on November 30, 1972), and were objected to on 
that basis (T. 79). This Court concluded in the second carbon 
Canal Co. case that efforts made or work done after the expira-
tion of an extension period were immaterial (19 ut.2d at ll). 
This was the view of the Trial Court (T. 10). "'hese docu1uents 
were admitted simply to show what had transpired after the Pre-
Trial Order had been entered (T. 77), but not to show diligence 
during the relevant period of time (T. 77). 
2. Appellant's Domestic Problems are not a Bas1s 
for Further Extensions 
Appellant's other reason given in his last extens1or. 
request to the State Engineer was that he had been 1nvclved 1n 
12 
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a long, drawn-out divorce action. This, of course, could have 
no direct bearing on his inability to secure the necessary 
rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land Management. Appellant 
did not state in his extension request how this divorce action 
prevented his completing the development of these Applications, 
and did not amplify this matter to any degree in his testimony 
at the Trial. The great bulk of his testimony centered around 
his problems with the Bureau of Land Management. It appears 
mat his domestic difficulties contrlbuted to problems with his 
nerves (T. 27), and presumably the dlvorce action placed an 
additional financial strain on him. However, ~s pointed out by 
this Court, health and financial problems ·,all :-~ot ser''"' ~- ~ 
basis for continued extenslons of time (Carbon Canal Co. v. San-
oete Water ~sers Assoc., 19 Ut.2d at 12) Also, see Ophir Sil-
'ler Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 :<lev. 534 .:.36::. 1 , and Maricopa 
Countv Municioal Water Conservancy Dist. ~o. 1 v. Southwest 
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, .J P. 2d 360 (1931). From Appellant's 
failure to clarify how hls divorce problems prevented the devel-
opment of hls Applications, it can only be assumed that this 
matter was secondarJ to his ?roblems wit~ the Bureau of Land 
Management. 
3. An Extension Cannot be Justif1ed 0:1 Appellant's 
Past Expenditures 
.:"\poellant 'las onl:.: made a very modest i:1vestrnent 
ln the sub~ect .:"\p~l1ca:::.cns O'.'e!" a substantial period of time, 
and h1s expend1tures on ::'lese Ap~i_catlons do not justif~ any 
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further extension of time. This is clearly demonstrated by 
Appellant's own sworn extension requests: 
(1) Application No. 36570 -- Appellant was granted 
four separate extension requests on this Application, covering 
a period of time from July 11, 1966 (when the Application was 
approved) to November 30, 1972 (when the last extension period 
expired) . This is a period of approximately six and one-half 
years. Appellant's last extension request recites that approx-
imately $200.00 had been spent on development work and that the 
estimated cost of completing the project would be $1,500.00. 
Thus, according to Appellant, the total cost of the project 
would be $1,700.00. During the 6~ years this Application was 
approved, Appellant completed approximately one-eighth of the 
work on the project for an average expenditure of less than 
$33.00 per year. At that rate, another 45 years would be re-
quired to complete the project: Further, the $200.00 was spent 
during an earlier extension period (Ex. 2, Tab 2), and there is 
no evidence that Appellant expended any additional funds during 
the period prior to the denial of further extension of time. 
It is extremely difficult to see how Appellant believes these 
facts justify any further extension of time for this Applica-
tion. 
(2) Application No. 35444 -- Appellant was also 
granted four separate extensions of time on this fillng. ThlS 
Application was approved on February 11, 1965, and the last ex-
14 
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tension expired November 30, 1972. This covers a period just 
short of eight years. Appellant's last extension request (Ex. 
3, Tab 8) states that $400.00 worth of work had been done on 
the project. Thus, during a period of approximately eight years, 
Appellant spent $400.00, for an average of approximately $50.00 
per year. Further, from a description of the work done, it seems 
clear that these funds were expended during prior extension per-
iods (Ex. 3, compare Tabs 2 & 3 with Tab 8). The expenditure of 
an average of $50.00 a year--with no expenditure at all during 
the final extension period--cannot serve as justification for a 
further extension of time. 
(3) Application No. 33554 -- This Appllcation was 
approved November 23, 1962, and Appellant has since been granted 
five extensions covering a period of approximately ten years. 
Appellant's latest extension reques~ states that approximately 
$2,100.00 had been expended (Ex. 4, Tab 10), although part of 
this appears to have been expended during prior extension per-
iods (Ex. 4, Tab 5). At the Trial, Appellant estimated he had 
spent more than the $2,100.00 on this well development (T. 20-
21). However, the relevant point to be made here is that the 
bulk of this money was spent for the drl11ing of a well which 
was outside the scope of thls project (T. 35-39). The Trial 
Court correctly ruled (R. 49) ~hat funds spent outside the scope 
of the project covered by Appe:1ant's approved Application could 
not be consldered in eva1ua~l~g 9ast diligence, and Appellant 
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has not disputed this. This leaves Appellant with an extremely 
modest financial showing for an Application approved for a 
decade. 
At the Trial, Appellant estimated his total investment in 
these three Applications as somewhat higher than shown on his 
extension requests (T. 20-21), but--as pointed out above--the 
bulk of these additional funds were spent on a well which was 
outside the scope of Appellant's approved Applications (T. 35-
38). Also, Appellant's estimate included money spent on attor-
ney's fees relating to his trespass problems with the Bureau of 
Land Management, and Appellant concedes that this expenditure 
should not be included in the funds expended on these Applica-
tions (T. 43-44). Further, Appellant conceded on cross-examina-
tion that in terms of dollars spent, the $200.00 on Application 
No. 36570 and the $400.00 on Application No. 35444 were accur-
ate figures (T. 41-42) . 
The money spent on diversion works authorized by these App-
lications shows an extremely modest investment by Appellant to 
tie up a total of 4.5 c.f.s. of water for such an extended ?er-
iod of time. Certainly this investment falls far short of dem-
onstrating due diligence or reasonable cause for delay by the 
" ... high type of convincing evidence demanded in water dev-
elopment cases" (Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Assos_, 
19 Ut. 2d at 8. 
16 
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4. Appellant has not Met the Standard Required for 
Projects of this Nature 
On page ll of his Brief, Appellant asserts that the 
State Engineer is exacting too much diligence from applicants. 
This is not true, but it is true that the State Engineer is re-
quiring relatively small projects such as this to be completed 
without undue delay. This is proper with the ever-increasing 
demands for the available water supply in this State; and par-
ticularly so where other potential applicants are awaiting an 
opportunity to develop the water. Appellant complains that the 
State Engineer is too harsh in his requirement that no more time 
be allowed for these Applications, and that the State Engineer 
has no uniform standard for evaluating extenslon ~e~-~sts. This 
is not so. The State Engineer testified at length that nothing 
is being required of Appellant that is not required of other 
applicants with similar ~rejects, and ~hat a uniform policy ex-
ists for all appllcations of this nature (T. 47-54). The plain 
fact is that Appellant lS no closer to solving his right-of-way 
problems with the Bureau of Land Management today than he was 
on the day his Applications were approved, and his prior expend-
itures on these .:l.pplications does not JUStify further delay. 
Appellant suggests that slnce Section 73-3-12 allows the 
State Englneer to grant extenslons ~or up to fi~ty years, he 
should be more generous than he is on applications. Certainly 
there are a ~e'"' sit·-.~at::.ons '"'hlch ma:.: ]UStify this kind of time-
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such as the multi-million-dollar Central Utah Project--but 
even then substantial progress on development must be shown. 
To allow small and relatively inexpen5ive projects to tie up 
water for an extended period of time without development would 
totally frustrate water development in this State and is clearly 
at odds with the due diligence mandate of Section 73-3-12. 
POINT II 
DENIAL OF ANY FURTHER EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEL-
LANT'S THREE APPLICATIONS IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
FACTS, EVEN THOUGH THESE APPLICATIONS HAD NOT BEEN 
APPROVED FOR THE SAME PERIODS OF TIME 
Appellant states under Point II of his Brief that it was 
improper for the State Engineer to consider all three Applica-
tions together and to lapse them at the same time. It was 
Appellant--and not the State Engineer--who tied the three App-
lications together. Throughout the period that Appellant was 
making his extension requests, his primary reason for seeking 
additional time to develop these Applications was his inability 
to obtain the necessary rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land 
Management. In his final extension request he used virtually 
identical language for each Application --his problems with the 
Bureau of Land Management and his drawn-out divorce action (Ex. 
2, Tab 8; Ex. 3, Tab 8; Ex. 4, Tab 10). The State Engineer did 
evaluate each Application separately, but Appellant's reasons 
for requesting additional time were the same on each filing. 
Appellant then goes on to state that the shorter periods given 
on two of the three Applications--approximately eight years on 
18 
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Application No. 35444 (Ex. 3) and six and one-half years on 
Application :<o. 36570 (Ex. 2)--were prejudicial to him. This 
is most difficult to understand. If Appellant was unable to 
solve his problems with the Bureau of Land Management in the 
ten-year period he had on Application No. 33554 (Ex. 4), there 
is certainly no basis to suggest that he could have done so on 
the other two Applications in the same amount of time, and 
Appellant has suggested none. Appellant goes on to make the 
erroneous argument that he was caught in a cross-fire between 
the Bureau of Land Management and the State Engineer because 
after the State Engineer denied further extensions of time the 
Bureau of Land Management would not grant him the rights-of-
way. What Appellant fails to acknowledge is that the State 
Engineer had been extremely generous in granting prior exten-
sions of time to give Appellant ample opport~nity to solve his 
problems with the Bureau of Land Management. To now suggest 
that Appellant is being treated unfairly by the State Engineer 
because of his problems with the Bureau of Land Management is 
totally unfounded. The State Engineer went beyond his usual 
procedures on applications of this magnitude to give Appellant 
everJ opportunity to resolve his right-of-way problems (T. 54, 
65). Further, the State Engineer advised Appellant of his 
growing concern over the lack of development under ~~ese Appli-
cations. On each of these three Applications, in granting the 
last extension, the State Engineer advised Appellant in his 
19 
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Memorandum Decisions that in light of the past record further 
extensions would be critically reviewed, and unless the water 
had been utilized further extensions would be denied (Ex. 2, 
Tab 7; Ex. 3, Tab 7; Ex. 4, Tab 9). Appellant goes on to gra-
tuitously state that his past performance--or lack of it--shoul: 
not be used the judge what he can accomplish in the future. 
However, Appellant fails to point to any evidence or to develo~ 
any argument why this is so. 
Appellant suggests that the Trial Court would have ruled 
differently if Appellant had some assurance that the right-of-
way approval would be forthcoming in the future. Again, this 
is not so. The Trial Court, in accordance with the prior dec1- , 
sion of this Court in the second Carbon Canal Co. case, supra, 
properly restricted the evidence and the evaluation of diligenc: 
or reasonable cause for delay to the extension period (T. 10). 
Further, Appellant can give no such assurances because the Bur-
eau of Land Management has not indicated that he will ever get 
such rights-of-way. 
Finally, thorughout his Brief, Appellant argues in broad 
generalities that the Findings of Fact of the Trial Court are 
erroneous and incorrect, but it is significant that Appellant 
has not pointed to any specific Finding which he believes to 
be improper, nor has he directed the Court's attention to an;· 
specific evidence in the record to support his argument. ThlS 
is not surprising, since the F1ndings of the Tr1al Court are 
20 
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fully supported by the evidence. This Court has repeatedly 
held that it will not disturb Findings of Fact of Trial Courts 
unless they are clearly erroneous and contrary to the weight of 
the evidence (Nunley v. Walker, 13 Ut.2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962) 
Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Ut.2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 
(1962); McBride v. McBride, P.2d (June 8, 1978). 
Appellant has fallen woefully short of making any showing that 
the Findings in this case are not supported by the evidence. 
The argument under Point III of Appellant's Brief is nothing 
more than an adoption of his arguments under Points I and II of 
his Brief. The arguments developed under t~ese Poi~~s ~ave been 
fully responded to abO'Ie, and there is ~o need to repea': them 
under a separate Point. 
CONCLUSION 
In Ctah, water has been declared by the Legislature to be 
public property (Section 73-1-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended) . R~ghts to the use of this public resource can onl:l 
be acqu~red as ;:rovlded for in the water code, and the concept 
of due diligence in perfecting an approved application forms 
an integral part of Utah's basic water law. Appellant has been 
gl'len cnore than ample opportunity to develop these three Appli-
cations, but lS no closer to accompllshing thls than when these 
Applicatlons were appro'led. .=In app l~can t 'tJho has been unable 
to secure <:.:-.e :1eces3a::-· ri;hts-c:-'Nay ~:.J utllize the water, is 
w1~t1cut 3~ 1~~e~es~ 1~ :~e ?rope~~~- where the water is to be 
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used, and has made only a modest investment in the development 
of his projects over a substantial number of years, has failed 
to demonstrate that he is entitled to any further extension of 
time by the high degree of proof required by this Court in 
water development cases. Others should have an opportunity to 
utilize this public 
JENS 
Assistant At 
Attorney fo tate Engineer 
442 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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